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Reports of the increase in the
vindictive feeling of the inhabitants of
the western waters toward the Spaniards
gave concern both to the American
government and to the authorities of
Spain. It was feared that assertion of
their supposed rights might take the
form of a military invasion of Spanish
Louisiana and a seizure of the port of
New Orleans, even in defiance of the
Federal government. There already
existed in several quarters local
movements for separation from the
Federal government, itself. In Vermont,
under the leadership of the
Revolutionary hero, Ethan Allen, and his
brothers the movement was toward a
connection with Great Britain; and in
the Valley of the Mississippi it was
toward alliance with the government that
controlled the navigation of the
Mississippi.
The Spanish authorities were aware of
their government's weakness and feared
the result of a combination of the
mounted riflemen living on the Kentucky,
Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and an
invasion by them. But they were also
aware of elements of strength on the
part of themselves in their ability to
let loose or restrain the Creeks and
other Indian tribes, near neighbors of
the western peoples; and to hold out as
a temptation the free navigation of the
lordly Mississippi.
It had now become the policy of Spain,
by the use of these factors of strength,
to win over the frontier communities, if
not to a political incorporation then to
independence and an alliance of some
sort with Spain.
The Intendant Navarro, writing to Spain
in 1788, urged the necessity of inducing
the Westerners to separate from the
people of the seaboard by the grant of
commercial privileges and of cooperation
to hold in check the Indians who were
under Spanish influence. Gardoqui, the
Spanish minister in this country, gave a
ready assent to the policy as did also
Miro, governor of Louisiana.
When the shrewd Gardoqui learned of the
bitter breach between the old-and
new-state men in Franklin he judged that
the time was ripe to avail of the
disaffection. In that quarter, as on the
Cumberland, he used as emissary Dr.
James White, a resident of the
Cumberland Settlement, who was a member
of the Continental Congress—the only
representative Trans-Alleghany Carolina
ever had in that body; therefore, the
first in any national council. White was
at the time also superintendent of the
Southern Indians for the general
government.
Active intrigue was begun in April,
1788, occasion being afforded by the
appeal of Governor Johnston, of North
Carolina, through White for Spanish
cooperation in restraining the Indians.
On the 18th, Gardoqui wrote letters to
Governor Johnston, James Robertson and
John Sevier. In the letter to Sevier he
adroitly said: "His Majesty is very
favorably inclined to give the
inhabitants of that region all the
protection they ask for; and, on my
part, I shall take very great pleasure
in contributing on this occasion and on
other occasions."1
On the 21st, White addressed a
communication to Governor Johnston in
which he announced his purpose to leave
the sittings of Congress for a period;
"in the present state of the treasury no
services to the United States can be
rewarded." He assured Johnston that the
Spanish officials were beginning to be
convinced that people of the Western
Country were to be restrained rather by
benevolence than violence; and that the
attitude of the Eastern States toward
the West as to the formation of new
States in that region was based on
jealousy of additional weight and
influence to the southward. "If their
partial views are indulged, affection,
fear nor interest will not long hold the
trans-mountain people dependent on the
Atlantic States."2
This accords with what Gardoqui wrote
home to Floridablanca, on the 18th: that
the future policy of Spain's
representatives would be to treat the
Westerners with the greatest generosity;
that he did not believe Spain could
force the frontiersmen out of Franklin,
which was yet actually claimed to be a
Spanish territory, but that he had
secret advices that by proper treatment
they might be brought under Spanish
influence.3
At this very time, a special agent of
the Secretary of War was in Franklin to
investigate how much truth there was in
the representations of Captain John
Sullivan and others, which had been
given wide publicity by the press: that
preparations for an armed conquest of
Louisiana were going forward in
Franklin.4
Lieutenant John Armstrong, of the First
Regiment, U. S. Army, arrived in
Franklin April 8th, 1788, and visited
the counties of Sullivan, Washington and
Greene, interviewing the most
intelligent men. He reported his
conviction that "there is not, and has
not been, any design formed or forming
of the nature mentioned in the letter
signed John Sullivan, nor has he ever
been in that settlement. I could not
learn that any British agents had been
in the settlements of Holston."
Armstrong, commenting on the division of
sentiment and the Sevier-Tipton battle
of February 29th, states that from the
nature "of this dispute, had any such
design been on foot, I should have been
informed by one party or another." He
expressed the opinion that "the
interposition of the United States will
be necessary to put a stop to the
effusion of blood in this quarter."5
Sevier, as has been seen, was in the
spring and summer of 1788 on the
frontier of Franklin struggling
valiantly to defend the settlers south
of the French Broad against the Indians;
and there Dr. White found him, a
proscribed man, but still holding to the
vestiges of the State of Franklin in
hope that by some fortuity at this
critical and changeful period in
governmental structures, the State might
yet be securely established. In
near-desperation and seeing the national
situation as it was painted by White,
Sevier wrote to Gardoqui about June 1st,
and again on July 18th. Of these
communications no trace seems to have
been found. Doubtless by them Sevier
sought, without compromising committal,
to procure much needed supplies of
ammunition from the Spaniards and to
secure their influence in curbing the
Indians, particularly the Creeks and the
Chickamaugas.
After he learned of the failure of the
North Carolina convention (August 1st)
to ratify the Federal Constitution,
there was presented to Sevier, outlawed
by that State, no alternative to
yielding allegiance to it as a State out
of the Union but continued resistance.
He thought that the refusal to enter the
new Federal Union was probably final.
The majority in convention against
ratification was so large as apparently
to be thus far decisive.
One chance of securing for Franklin
federal recognition was perceivable.
With North Carolina out of the Union the
Congress might conclude to admit the
State of Franklin on the basis of the
irrepealability of the first cession
act. On the other hand should North
Carolina later on reconsider and become
a State of the Union then one of the
provisions of the new Federal
Constitution would acknowledge that
State's ultimate sovereignty over the
western lands, and give her the power to
veto the admission of a new State in the
West.
By reason of his successful campaigning
against the Indians Sevier had now
"regained his influence to a great
degree" and "put himself at the head of
the Federalists, and menaces the State
of North Carolina for putting themselves
out of the Union by rejecting the new
Constitution."6
On September 12th, Sevier in the changed
circumstances, adopted a radical course,
more with intent to defy the old State
than to swing Franklin to a new
allegiance. He wrote two letters to the
Spanish minister. In one, he solicited
the good offices of that official to
prevent an alliance of the Creeks,
Choctaws and Chickasaws with the
Cherokees who "continued the war with
all liberty." He suggested that the
inhabitants of Franklin might form a new
settlement in the Great Bend of
Tennessee; and intervention to obviate
opposition was sought.
Two historians who have made a close
study of this period and phase, James
and Whitaker, are in agreement that aid
in carrying out the long-cherished
project of settlement of the Great Bend
was the chief motive that prompted both
White and Sevier. Indeed, White's
disclosures to Gayoso were full enough
to convince the latter that the
Franklinites' desire was for that
region, and Gayoso was convinced that it
was not compatible with the real
interests of Spain. In May, 1789, Gayoso
wrote to Valdes a letter which sheds
valuable light on the men and their
motives:
"White is thoroughly republican at
heart. The movement that is taking place
in the State of Franklin has as its
object the establishment of independence
rather than a rapprochment with Spain.
The Franklinites know that it is to
their interest to form a connection with
this province [Louisiana] and they wish
to do so, but they are extremely
ambitious and their principal object is
to extend their territory so that it may
draw near the Mississippi and Mobile
Rivers, in the hope that this advantage
will attract many immigrants from other
places, and enable them to build up an
opulent State."6a
The second letter should be read in the
light of the fact that the original of
it does not exist. A copy of it,
translated into Spanish, is preserved in
the Gardoqui manuscripts; and this
translation was made by Spanish
officials who were interested in placing
upon the original the construction that
would be the more likely to bring
favorable action from the home
government in behalf of the plan which
Gardoqui had formulated and sponsored.
The translation of this letter back into
English is that of Henderson:
Franklin, September 12, 1788.
Sir:
Since my last, of the 18th of July, upon
consulting with the principal men of
this country, I have been particularly
happy to find that they are as well
disposed and willing as I am in respect
to your proposals and guarantees. You
may be sure that the favorable hopes and
ideas that the people of this country
maintain with respect to the future
probability of an alliance and
concession of commerce with you in the
future are very ardent and that we are
unanimously determined to that effect.
The people of this country have come to
realize truly upon what part of the
world and upon what nation depend their
future happiness and security, and they
readily infer that the interest and
prosperity of it depend entirely upon
the protection and liberality of your
government. We must expect it of our
situation and circumstances that they
will lead us on in the most effective
manner to look for the long security and
prosperity of your government in
America, and, being the first to resort
in this way to your protection and
liberality from this side of the
Appalachian Mountains, we feel
encouraged to maintain the greatest hope
that we shall be granted all reasonable
helps by him who is so amply able to do
it and give the protection and help that
is asked in this our petition. You know
our delicate situation and the
difficulties in which we are in respect
to our mother State, which makes use of
all stratagems to impede the development
and prosperity of this country. In spite
of the fact that we possess some of the
most fertile lands on this continent and
easy means of exportation, yet we cannot
dispose of a single article of its
products (which would be almost
innumerable) unless we have authority to
make use of our rivers toward the ports
below. Seeing us in these
embarrassments, it is easy for you to
realize the great scarcity of specie in
this country, of which there is very
little among us. Nothing else is lacking
in order to assure our mutual interests
but a small sum of this article (the
quantity of which I leave to your
prudent judgment) and such other,
military, assistance as your
understanding deems it necessary and
convenient to supply us with. All that
is needed to attain what we want will
not be more than a few thousand pounds.
We are further encouraged to make this
application because of your knowledge
that we can pay promptly for whatever
you may be able to supply, by sending
the products of this country to the
ports below. I hope that the payment of
this (i.e of the loans) will be made
with all convenience and that the
pledges and receipts of our friend James
Sevier (who is our secretary) will
obligate both myself and the State of
Franklin until they are entirely repaid
and satisfied. I do not doubt that the
help which is asked will be considered a
trifle that is taken out of the
treasury, especially when it is compared
with the important object to which it is
directed, and when we can repay so soon
the sum that is advanced and when it
will leave us under the greatest
obligation of gratitude and perpetual
friendship. We are determined, in so far
as it is possible for us, that you shall
so regard us; and when you see the
advantages that will regularly arise
from this connection, you will consider
that our interests, which run in the
same channel, will last and be
inseparable. It behooves us to make the
most prompt and necessary preparations
for defence. If any break should happen,
we must be prepared in time—the reason
for which will necessarily be very
obvious to you. Therefore, it is not
necessary for me to say anything else
about the subject and I beg of you to
inform me from time to time, whenever
opportunity offers and circumstances
require it. I leave to you the choice of
any other, more easy mode of
communication than the present one, and
for other matters I refer you to my son
James, who is a competent person to give
a perfect account of whatever concerns
the Western Country. Before finishing,
it may be necessary to inform you that
there will be no more favorable occasion
than the present one to put the plan
into action. North Carolina has rejected
the Constitution, and at the least a
considerable time will pass before it
becomes a member of the Union, if this
ever happens. I beg you to supply James
with whatever you think will be useful
to us. If perchance you could get a
passport, it would be of great profit to
this country, because it is probable
that some of us will find it convenient
to go down to the Spanish ports; and if
we are allowed to ship products of this
country it will be a matter of great
importance for us. I have the honor to
be, Sir, with great esteem and
consideration, your most respectful
servant,
(Signed) JOHN SEVIER
To Senor Don Diego de Gardoqui, Minister
of Spain.7
This document has been referred to or
quoted by Gayarre and Winsor as evidence
that Sevier proposed to throw the State
of Franklin into the arms of Spain. Even
as rendered by the Spaniards, it is not
properly susceptible of such a
construction. Its writer was intent on
procuring prompt aid; to that end he
went as far in statement and implication
as his ultimate purpose would admit. He
proposed an alliance of friendly
sovereignties, not an incorporation. He
solicited a loan, not a grant. The
preparations were for defense, not
attack, and against North Carolina. The
small amount of aid asked clearly so
shows. Roosevelt, fairer to Sevier in
this than in some other matters, thus
summarizes: "He jumped at Gardoqui's
cautious offers; though careful not to
promise to subject himself to Spain, and
doubtless with no idea of playing the
part of Spanish vassal longer than the
needs of the moment required."8
Sevier did not intend to play the part
of vassal at all, in any true sense of
the word. Gayoso did not so conceive.
Gilmore, on the authority of the
historian Ramsey, in a statement of the
facts as Sevier himself had detailed
them, says that at the time Sevier wrote
the above letter he also communicated by
Captain Nathaniel Evans to General
Shelby what was being done by himself.9
The meaning of this act is clear when
Evans' and Shelby's attitude toward
North Carolina is remembered and
considered.
Recalling that North Carolina had voted
herself out of the Union, what could the
western people expect of her in the
matter of forcing open, single-handed,
the great waterway to New Orleans? James
Robertson, who went further than Sevier
in treating with the Spaniards, said
that he had earnestly endeavored to
convince the members of the Carolina
Assembly of 1788 who were opposed to
ceding the western lands that the
Westerners who had the greatest aversion
to taking the protection of Spain would
be compelled to leave their country or
become Spaniards. These members of the
Assembly he says "were indifferent as to
what became of us"; and all that was
done was the passage of a resolution
declaring that the citizens of the State
had an indisputable right to the
navigation of the Mississippi.
As a spur to cession General Daniel
Smith, writing from the Cumberland, gave
directly to Governor Johnston the
assurance that "many of the settlers
have been worn out with war; nothing
being done by government for our
protection; the Federal Constitution not
being agreed to; no cession made to
Congress—all these evils operated so
forcibly on their minds that had the
Spaniards offered us effectual
protection, I am persuaded many here
would have been for coming under their
government in hopes of getting their
calamities alleviated."10
General Smith himself was of the number.
One of these patriots may not be
indicted without indicting all. The
Cumberlanders did not act without notice
to North Carolina and their plans had in
contemplation efforts to gain the
consent of that State before any other
further decisive step should be taken.
As for Sevier: North Carolina was out of
the Union, and Franklin was out of North
Carolina. "If this be treason, make the
most of it." In a communication (October
30th) he said, pointedly enough for
apprehension of his meaning by the
Carolinians addressed:
Can it be that North Carolina is so void
of understanding as to think she is so
permanently fixed as not to be shaken?
Has she not discovered that there are
formidable and inveterate enemies around
her watching to take advantage of our
divisions, which I am sorry to say are
too numerous? Have you not discovered
that those people have it in their power
to do as much, at least, if not a great
deal more, for the Western Americans
than you can yourselves? Have you not
seen the most affectionate child become
sour and inveterate against the parent
when the parental, tender ties of
humanity have been refused?11
As for another, the champion of North
Carolina in Franklin, and his connection
with Spain: Joseph Martin, then
brigadier-general of Carolina on
November 8, 1788, wrote to McGillivray,
who was in the employ of the Spanish
authorities:
I must beg that you write me by the
first opportunity in answer to what I am
now going to say to you. I am daily
applied to by a body of very respectable
people to make application to you for
liberty to settle on Tombigby. If you
give me proper indulgence, I make no
doubt of Soo families removing there
under my directtion. . . I hope to do
honor to any part of the world I settle
in, and am determined to leave the
United States for reasons that I can
assign to you when we meet, but durst
not trust it to paper.
General Martin was acquitted of
wrongdoing by the Carolina Assembly
which could not fail to see that if
there were dereliction that body could
not itself escape a measure of
condemnation.
A new would-be factor in Spanish
intrigues in the West was the mendacious
Irishman, Dr. James O'Fallon, of
Charleston and later of Kentucky. He was
the agent for the South Carolina Yazoo
Company. In a letter to Gardoqui, of
date May 26, 1788, he outlined an
ambitious project for a colony of
Catholics, to be mostly Irish, on a
grant of land from Spain sufficient to
give 857 acres each to 5,000 heads of
families to be settled within a period
of seven years. The location of the
proposed concession was across the
debatable northern margin of East
Florida. O'Fallon urged upon Gardoqui
the need of political relations with the
Anglo-Americans living on the western
waters, and he mentioned propositions he
claimed to have received from Kentucky
and Franklin.12
In Kentucky intrigue was taking on the
deeper color of conspiracy, under the
machinations of Wilkinson. Restless
Arthur Campbell was taking it on himself
to advise Innes that there should be "a
general coalescence of the Western
Countries," and Innes in reply bemoaned
the eclipse of the State of Franklin. "I
have been expecting such an event. In
cases of that kind if discord takes
place, the whole system becomes
distorted and it generally ends in
lasting factions." Innes expressed the
view that no relief could be expected
from the new national constitutional
system. "There may be a change of men
but their ideas will be the same, and
when you reflect that the promoting of
the interest of the Western Country will
tend to almost a depopulation of the
Eastern, we cannot even hope that our
interests will be considered."13
There was not lacking some justification
for the last statement when such views
obtained in the East as Governor Clinton
had openly professed to Gardoqui—that
the peopling of the West from the East
was a national calamity. When such
sentiments were purposely passed on to
penetrate the frontiers, irritation and
indignation could but result.14
___________
1 Henderson, The Spanish
Conspiracy in Tennessee, Tenn.
Historical Mag., III, 233, quoting
Gardoqui MSS., in Durrett Collection.
2 N. C. St. Rec., XXI, 465,
White to the Govenor of North Carolina.
3 Roosevelt, Winning of the
West, IV, 229.
4 This is the rumor referred
to, ante, p. 138.
5 State Dept. MSS., Vol. III,
551, April 28, 1788.
6 Gilmore, Advance Guard of
the Western Civilization, 333.
6a Whitaker, The Muscle
Shoals Speculation, Miss. Valley }Est.
Review, XIII, 365, 384, citing the
National Archives at Madrid. In 1789
White was dissuading Cumberland people
from removing to the Spanish
possessions. N. C. St. Rec.,XXII, 792.
7 Henderson, The Spanish
Conspiracy, 234; Conquest of the Old
Southwest, 334.
8 Winning of the West, IV,
23o. Roosevelt represents that Sevier
because baffled by the occurrences of
October and November, suddenly became a
Federalist; and, strangely in the same
connection, quotes apt authority to the
effect that Sevier had been an advocate
of the Federal Constitution in August.
"This particular move was fairly comic
in its abrupt unexpectedness," he says.
It is submitted that the comic role is
Roosevelt's own, in this instance. For
evidence of prompt advocacy of the work
of the constitutional convention of
1787, by Sevier and his followers, see
p. 64, ante.
9 Advance Guard, 333.
10 N. C. St. Rec., XXII, 79o.
11 N. C. St. Rec., XXI, 559,
and XXII, 697, 787.
12Gardoqui Papers, I, 198,
Durrett Coll., Univ. of Chicago; Parish,
Intrigues of Dr. fames O'Fallon, Miss.
Valley Hist. Review, XVII, 23o;
Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier,
"129; Serano y Sanz, Espana y Los Indios
Cherokis y Chactas, 47, 52. O'Fallon
twice visited the Franklin region in the
interest of his designs, which as time
ran took on kaleidoscopic changes.
13Innes to Campbell,
September 19, 1788, Draper MSS., 9 DD
51.
14 Hamilton's opinion was
that if Spain were allowed to persist in
her policy of barring the Mississippi to
navigation, the result would be "a war
with Spain, or a separation of the
Western Country. This country must have
an outlet for its commodities. This is
essential to its prosperity and if not
procured to it by the United States,
must be had at the expense of the
connection with them." (1790). |
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